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Abstract
Traditional finance theory based on the assumptions of symmetric
information and perfect and competitive markets has provided many
important insights. These include the Modigliani and Miller Theorems,
the CAPM, the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and continuous time finance.
However, many empirical phenomena are difficult to reconcile with this
traditional framework. Game theoretic techniques have allowed insights
into a number of these. Many puzzles remain. This paper argues that
recent advances in game theory concerned with higher order beliefs,
informational cascades and heterogeneous prior beliefs have the potential
to provide insights into some of these remaining puzzles.
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1. Introduction
Finance is concerned with how the savings of investors are allocated through financial markets and intermediaries to firms, which use them to fund their activities. Finance
can be broadly divided into two fields. The first is asset pricing, which is concerned with
the decisions of investors. The second is corporate finance, which is concerned with the
decisions of firms. Traditional neoclassical economics did not attach much importance to
either kind of finance. It was more concerned with the production, pricing and allocation
of inputs and outputs and the operation of the markets for these. Models assumed certainty and in this context financial decisions are relatively straightforward. However,
even with this simple methodology important concepts such as the time value of money
and discounting were developed.
Finance developed as a field in its own right with the introduction of uncertainty into
asset pricing and the recognition that classical analysis failed to explain many aspects of
corporate finance. In Section 2, we review the set of issues raised and some of the
remaining problems with the pre-game theoretic literature. In Section 3, we recount how
a first generation of game theory models tackled those problems, and discuss the successes and failures. Our purpose in this section is to point to some of the main themes in
the various sub-fields. We do not attempt to provide an introduction to game theory (see
Gibbons (1992) for a general introduction to applied game theory and Thakor (1991) for
a survey of game theory in finance including an introduction to game theory). Nor do we
attempt to be encyclopedic.
This first generation of game theoretic models revolutionized finance but much
remains to be explained. Game theoretic methods keep developing and we believe that
some developments involving richer informational models are especially relevant for
finance: in Section 4, we review recent work concerning higher order beliefs and informational cascades and discuss its relevance for finance. We also review work that entails
differences in beliefs not explained by differences in information.

2. The Main Issues in Finance
2.1 Asset Pricing
The focus of Keynesian macroeconomics on uncertainty and the operation of financial markets lead to the development of frameworks for analyzing risk. Keynes (1936)
and Hicks (1939) took account of risk by adding a risk premium to the interest rate.
However, there was no systematic theory underlying this risk premium. The key theoretical development which eventually lead to such a theory was von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s (1947) axiomatic approach to choice under uncertainty. Their notion of
expected utility, developed originally for use in game theory, underlies the vast majority
of theories of asset pricing.
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Portfolio Theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model
Markowitz (1952; 1959) utilized a special case of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
expected utility to develop a theory of portfolio choice. He considered the case where
investors are only concerned with the mean and variance of the payoffs of the portfolios
they are choosing. This is a special case of expected utility provided the investor’s utility
of consumption is quadratic and/or asset returns are multinormally distributed. Markowitz’s main result was to show that diversifying holdings is optimal and the benefit that
can be obtained depends on the covariances of asset returns. Tobin’s (1958) work on
liquidity preference helped to establish the mean-variance framework as the standard
approach to portfolio choice problems. Subsequent authors developed portfolio theory
considerably (see Constantinides and Malliaris (1995)).
It was not until some time after Markowitz’s original contribution that his framework
of individual portfolio choice was used as the basis for an equilibrium theory, namely the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Brennan (1989) has argued that the reason for the
delay was the boldness of the assumption that all investors have the same beliefs about
the means and variances of all assets. Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) showed that in
equilibrium
Eri = rf + βi(ErM – rF),
where Eri is the expected return on asset i, rf is the return on the risk free asset, ErM is the
expected return on the market portfolio (i.e., a value weighted portfolio of all the assets in
the market) and βi = cov(ri, rM)/var(rM). Black (1972) demonstrated that the same relationship held even if no risk free asset existed provided rF was replaced by the expected
return on a portfolio or asset with β = 0. The model formalizes the risk premium of
Keynes and Hicks and shows that it depends on the covariance of returns with other
assets.
Despite being based on the very strong assumptions of mean-variance preferences
and homogeneity of investor beliefs, the CAPM was an extremely important development
in finance. It not only provided key theoretical insights concerning the pricing of stocks
but also lead to a great deal of empirical work testing whether these predictions held in
practice. Early tests such as Fama and Macbeth (1973) provided some support for the
model. Subsequent tests using more sophisticated econometric techniques have not been
so encouraging. Ferson (1995) contains a review of these tests.
The CAPM is only one of many asset-pricing models that has been developed. Other
models include the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) of Ross (1977a) and the representative agent asset-pricing model of Lucas (1978). However, the CAPM was the most
important not only because it was useful in its own right for such things as deriving discount rates for capital budgeting but also because it allowed investigators to easily adjust
for risk when considering a variety of topics. We turn next to one of the most important
hypotheses that resulted from this ability to adjust for risk.
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Market Efficiency
In models with competitive markets, symmetric information and no frictions like
transaction costs, the only variations in returns across assets are due to differences in risk.
All information that is available to investors becomes reflected in stock prices and no investor can earn higher returns except by bearing more risk. In the CAPM, for example, it
is only differences in β’s that cause differences in returns. The idea that the differences
in returns are due to differences in risk came to be known as the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis. During the 1960’s a considerable amount of research was undertaken to see
whether U.S. stock markets were in fact efficient. In a well-known survey, Fama (1970)
argued that the balance of the evidence suggested markets were efficient. In a follow up
piece, Fama (1991) continued to argue that by and large markets were efficient despite
the documentation of many anomalies during the intervening period.
Standard tests of market efficiency involve a joint test of market efficiency and the
equilibrium asset-pricing model that is used in the analysis. Hence a rejection of the joint
hypothesis can either be a rejection of market efficiency or the asset-pricing model used
or both. Hawawini and Keim (1995) survey these “anomalies.” Basu (1977) discovered
one of the first. He pointed out that price to earnings (P/E) ratios provided more explanatory power than β’s. Firms with low P/E ratios (value stocks) tend to outperform
stocks with high P/E ratios (growth stocks). Banz (1981) showed that there was a significant relationship between the market value of common equity and returns (the size
effect). Stattman (1980) and others have demonstrated the significant predictive ability
of price per share to book value per share (P/B) ratios for returns. In an influential paper,
Fama and French (1993) have documented that firm size and the ratio of book to market
equity are important factors in explaining average stock returns. In addition to these
cross-sectional effects there are also a number of significant time series anomalies. Perhaps the best known of these is the January effect. Rozeff and Kinney (1976) found that
returns on an equal weighted index of NYSE stocks were much higher in January than in
the other months of the year. Keim (1983) demonstrated that the size effect was concentrated in January. Cross (1973) and French (1980) pointed out that the returns on S&P
composite index are negative on Mondays. Numerous other studies have confirmed this
weekend effect in a wide variety of circumstances.
These anomalies are difficult to reconcile with models of asset pricing such as the
CAPM. Most of them are little understood. Attempts have been made to explain the
January effect by tax loss selling at the end of the year. Even this is problematic because
in countries such as the U.K. and Australia where the tax year does not end in December
there is still a January effect. It would seem that the simple frameworks most asset pricing models adopt are not sufficient to capture the richness of the processes underlying
stock price formation.
Instead of trying to reconcile these anomalies with asset pricing theories based on
rational behavior, a number of authors have sought to explain them using behavioral
theories based on foundations taken from the psychology literature. For example,
Dreman (1982) argues that the P/E effect can be explained by investors’ tendency to
3

make extreme forecasts. High (low) P/E ratio stocks correspond to a forecast of high
(low) growth by the market. If investors predict too high (low) growth, high P/E stocks
will underperform (overperform). De Bondt and Thaler (1995) surveys behavioral explanations for this and other anomalies.
Continuous Time Models
Perhaps the most significant advance in asset pricing theory since the early models
were formulated was the extension of the paradigm to allow for continuous trading. This
approach was developed in a series of papers by Merton (1969; 1971; 1973a) and culminated in his development of the intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM). The
assumptions of expected utility maximization, symmetric information and frictionless
markets are maintained. By analyzing both the consumption and portfolio decisions of an
investor through time and assuming prices per share are generated by Ito processes,
greater realism and tractability compared to the mean-variance approach is achieved. In
particular, it is not necessary to assume quadratic utility or normally distributed returns.
Other important contributions that were developed using this framework were Breeden’s
(1979). Consumption CAPM and Cox, Ingersoll and Ross’s (1985) modeling of the term
structure of interest rates.
The relationship between continuous time models and the Arrow–Debreu general
equilibrium model was considered by Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Duffie and Huang
(1985). Repeated trading allows markets to be made effectively complete even though
there are only a few securities.
One of the most important uses of continuous time techniques is for the pricing of
derivative securities such as options. This was pioneered by Merton (1973b) and Black
and Scholes (1973) and lead to the development of a large literature that is surveyed in
Ross (1992). Not only has this work provided great theoretical insight but it has also
proved to be empirically implementable and of great practical use.
2.2 Corporate Finance
The second important area considered by finance is concerned with the financial decisions made by firms. These include the choice between debt and equity and the amount
to pay out in dividends. The seminal work in this area was Modigliani and Miller (1958)
and Miller and Modigliani (1961). They showed that with perfect markets (i.e., no frictions and symmetric information) and no taxes the total value of a firm is independent of
its debt/equity ratio. Similarly they demonstrated that the value of the firm is independent of the level of dividends. In their framework it is the investment decisions of the firm
that are important in determining its total value.
The importance of the Modigliani and Miller theorems was not as a description of
reality. Instead it was to stress the importance of taxes and capital market imperfections
in determining corporate financial policies. Incorporating the tax deductibility of interest
but not dividends and bankruptcy costs lead to the trade-off theory of capital structure.
4

Some debt is desirable because of the tax shield arising from interest deductibility but the
costs of bankruptcy and financial distress limit the amount that should be used. With
regard to dividend policy, incorporating the fact that capital gains are taxed less at the
personal level than dividends into the Modigliani and Miller framework gives the result
that all payouts should be made by repurchasing shares rather than by paying dividends.
The trade-off theory of capital structure does not provide a satisfactory explanation of
what firms do in practice. The tax advantage of debt relative to the magnitude of expected bankruptcy costs would seem to be such that firms should use more debt than is
actually observed. Attempts to explain this, such as M. Miller (1977), that incorporate
personal as well as corporate taxes into the theory of capital structure, have not been successful. In the Miller model there is a personal tax advantage to equity because capital
gains are only taxed on realization and a corporate tax advantage to debt because interest
is tax deductible. In equilibrium, people with personal tax rates above the corporate tax
rate hold equity while those with rates below hold debt. This prediction is not consistent
with what occurred in the U.S. in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s when there were no
personal tax rates above the corporate rate. The Miller model suggests that there should
have been a very large increase in the amount of debt used by corporations but there was
only a small change.
The tax-augmented theory of dividends also does not provide a good explanation of
what actually happens. Firms have paid out a substantial amount of their earnings as
dividends for many decades. Attempts to explain the puzzle using tax based theories
such as the clientele model have not been found convincing. They are difficult to reconcile with the fact that many people in high tax brackets hold large amounts of dividend
paying stocks and on the margin pay significant taxes on the dividends.
Within the Modigliani and Miller framework other corporate financial decisions also
do not create value except through tax effects and reductions in frictions such as transaction costs. Although theoretical insights are provided, the theories are not consistent with
what is observed in practice. As with the asset pricing models discussed above this is
perhaps not surprising given their simplicity. In particular, the assumptions of perfect
information and perfect markets are very strong.

3. The Game Theory Approach
The inability of standard finance theories to provide satisfactory explanations for observed phenomena lead to a search for theories using new methodologies. This was
particularly true in corporate finance where the existing models were so clearly unsatisfactory. Game theory has provided a methodology that has lead to insights into many
previously unexplained phenomena by allowing asymmetric information and strategic
interaction to be incorporated into the analysis. We start with a discussion of the use of
game theory in corporate finance where to date it has been most successfully applied.
We subsequently consider its role in asset pricing.
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3.1 Corporate Finance
Dividends as Signals
The thorniest issue in finance has been what Black (1976) termed “the dividend
puzzle.” Firms have historically paid out about a half of their earnings as dividends.
Many of these dividends were received by investors in high tax brackets who, on the
margin, paid substantial amounts of taxes on them. In addition, in a classic study Lintner
(1956) demonstrated that managers “smooth” dividends in the sense that they are less
variable than earnings. This finding was confirmed by Fama and Babiak (1968) and
numerous other authors. The puzzle has been to explain these observations (see Allen
and Michaely (1995) for a survey of this literature).
In their original article on dividends, Miller and Modigliani (1961) had suggested that
dividends might convey significant information about a firm’s prospects. However, it
was not until game theoretic methods were applied that any progress was made in understanding this issue. Bhattacharya’s (1979) model of dividends as a signal was one of the
first papers in finance to use these tools. His contribution started a large literature.
Bhattacharya assumes that managers have superior information about the profitability
of their firm’s investment. They can signal this to the capital market by “committing” to
a sufficiently high level of dividends. If it turns out the project is profitable these dividends can be paid from earnings without a problem. If the project is unprofitable then the
firm has to resort to outside finance and incur deadweight transaction costs. The firm
will therefore only find it worthwhile to commit to a high dividend level if in fact its
prospects are good. Subsequent authors like Miller and Rock (1985) and John and
Williams (1985) developed models which did not require assumptions such as committing to a certain level of dividends and where the deadweight costs required to make the
signal credible were plausible.
One of the problems with signaling models of dividends is that they typically suggest
that dividends will be paid to signal new information. Unless new information is
continually arriving there is no need to keep paying them. But in that case the level of
dividends should be varying to reflect the new information. This feature of dividend
signaling models is difficult to reconcile with smoothing. In an important piece, Kumar
(1988) develops a ‘coarse signaling’ theory that is consistent with the fact that firms
smooth dividends. Firms within a range of productivity all pay the same level of dividends. It is only when they move outside this range that they will alter their dividend
level.
Another problem in many dividend signaling models (including Kumar (1988)) is
that they do not explain why firms use dividends rather than share repurchases. In most
models the two are essentially equivalent except for the way that they are taxed since
both involve transferring cash from the firm to the owners. Dividends are typically
treated as ordinary income and taxed at high rates whereas repurchases involve price
appreciation being taxed at low capital gains rates. Building on work by Ofer and Thakor
(1987) and Barclay and Smith (1988), Brennan and Thakor (1990) suggest that repur6

chases have a disadvantage in that informed investors are able to bid for undervalued
stocks and avoid overvalued ones. There is thus an adverse selection problem. Dividends do not suffer from this problem because they are pro rata.
Some progress on understanding the dividend puzzle has been made in recent
years. This is one of the finance applications of game theory that has been somewhat
successful.
Capital Structure
The trade-off theory of capital structure mentioned above has been a textbook staple
for many years. Even though it had provided a better explanation of firms’ choices than
the initial dividend models, the theory is not entirely satisfactory because the empirical
magnitudes of bankruptcy costs and interest tax shields do not seem to match observed
capital structures. The use of game theoretic techniques in this field has also allowed it to
move ahead significantly. Harris and Raviv (1991) survey the area.
The first contributions in a game theoretic vein were signaling models. Ross (1977b)
develops a model where managers signal the prospects of the firm to the capital markets
by choosing an appropriate level of debt. The reason this acts as a signal is that bankruptcy is costly. A high debt firm with good prospects will only incur these costs occasionally while a similarly levered firm with poor prospects will incur them often. Leland
and Pyle (1977) consider a situation where entrepreneurs use their retained share of ownership in a firm to signal its value. Owners of high value firms retain a high share of the
firm to signal their type. Their high retention means they don’t get to diversify as much
as they would if there was symmetric information and it is this that makes it unattractive
for low value firms to mimic them.
Two subsequent papers based on asymmetric information which have been very
influential are Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). If managers are better
informed about the prospects of the firm than the capital markets they will be unwilling
to issue equity to finance investment projects if the equity is undervalued. Instead they
will have a preference for using equity when it is overvalued. Thus equity is regarded as
a bad signal. Myers (1984) uses this kind of reasoning to develop the “pecking order”
theory of financing. Instead of using equity to finance investment projects it will be
better to use less information sensitive sources of funds. Retained earnings are the most
preferred, with debt coming next and finally equity. The results of these papers and the
subsequent literature such as Stein (1992) and Nyborg (1995) are consistent with a number of stylized facts concerning the effect of issuing different types of security on stock
price and the financing choices of firms. However, in order to derive them strong
assumptions such as overwhelming bankruptcy aversion of managers are often necessary.
Moreover, as Dybvig and Zender (1991) and others have stressed they often assume suboptimal managerial incentive schemes. Dybvig and Zender show that if managerial
incentive schemes are chosen optimally the Modigliani and Miller irrelevance results can
hold even with asymmetric information.
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A second influential strand of the literature on capital structure that has used game
theoretic concepts is concerned with agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) pointed
to two kinds of agency problems in corporations. One is between equityholders and
bondholders and the other is between equityholders and managers. The first arises
because the owners of a levered firm have an incentive to take risks; they receive the surplus when returns are high but the bondholders bear the cost when default occurs.
Diamond (1989) has shown how reputation considerations can ameliorate this risk shifting incentive when there is a long time horizon. The second conflict arises when equityholders cannot fully control the actions of managers. This means that managers have an
incentive to pursue their own interests rather than those of the equityholders. Grossman
and Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986) among others have shown how debt can be used to
help overcome this problem. Myers (1977) has pointed to a third agency problem. If
there is a large amount of debt outstanding which is not backed by cash flows from the
firm’s assets, i.e. a “debt overhang,” equityholders may be reluctant to take on safe, profitable projects because the bondholders will have claim to a large part of the cash flows
from these.
The agency perspective has also lead to a series of important papers by Hart and
Moore and others on financial contracts. These use game theoretic techniques to shed
light on the role of incomplete contracting possibilities in determining financial contracts
and in particular debt. Hart and Moore (1989) consider an entrepreneur who wishes to
raise funds to undertake a project. Both the entrepreneur and the outside investor can
observe the project payoffs at each date, but they cannot write explicit contracts based on
these payoffs because third parties such as courts cannot observe them. The focus of
their analysis is the problem of providing an incentive for the entrepreneur to repay the
borrowed funds. Among other things, it is shown that the optimal contract is a debt contract and incentives to repay are provided by the ability of the creditor to seize the entrepreneur’s assets. Subsequent contributions include Hart and Moore (1994; 1998),
Aghion and Bolton (1992), Berglof and von Thadden (1994) and von Thadden (1995).
Hart (1995) contains an excellent account many of the main ideas in this literature.
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) theory of capital structure is such that the product
market decisions of firms are separated from financial market decisions. Essentially this
is achieved by assuming there is perfect competition in product markets. In an oligopolistic industry where there are strategic interactions between firms in the product market,
financial decisions are also likely to play an important role. Allen (1986), Brander and
Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1986) and a growing subsequent literature (see
Maksimovic (1995) for a survey) have considered various different aspects of these interactions between financing and product markets. Allen (1986) considers a duopoly model
where a bankrupt firm is at a strategic disadvantage in choosing its investment because
the bankruptcy process forces it to delay its decision. The bankrupt firm becomes a
follower in a Stackelberg investment game instead of a simultaneous mover in a Nash–
Cournot game. Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1986) analyze the role of
debt as a precommitment device in oligopoly models. By taking on a large amount of
debt a firm effectively precommits to a higher level of output. Titman (1984) and
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Maksimovic and Titman (1993) have considered the interaction between financial decisions and customers’ decisions. Titman (1984) looks at the effect of an increased
probability of bankruptcy on product price because, for example, of the difficulties of
obtaining spare parts and service should the firm cease to exist. Maksimovic and Titman
(1993) consider the relationship between capital structure and a firm’s reputational
incentives to maintain high product quality.
A significant component of the trade-off theory is the bankruptcy costs that limit the
use of debt. An important issue concerns the nature of these bankruptcy costs. Haugen
and Senbet (1978) argued that the extent of bankruptcy costs was limited because firms
could simply renegotiate the terms of the debt and avoid bankruptcy and its associated
costs. The literature on strategic behavior around and within bankruptcy that this contribution lead to used game theoretic techniques extensively (see Webb (1987),
Giammarino (1988), Brown (1989) and for a survey Senbet and Seward (1995)). It was
shown that Haugen and Senbet’s argument depended on the absence of frictions. With
asymmetric information or other frictions bankruptcy costs could occur in equilibrium.
The Market for Corporate Control
The concept of the market for corporate control was developed verbally by Manne
(1965). He argued that in order for resources to be used efficiently, it is necessary that
firms be run by the most able and competent managers. Manne suggests that the way in
which modern capitalist economies achieve this is through the market for corporate control. There are several ways in which this operates including tender offers, mergers and
proxy fights.
Traditional finance theory with its assumptions of symmetric information and perfectly competitive frictionless capital markets had very little to offer in terms of insights
into the market for corporate control. In fact the large premiums over initial stock market
valuations paid for targets appeared to be at variance with market efficiency and posed
something of a puzzle. Again it was not until the advent of game theoretic concepts and
techniques that much progress was made in this area.
The paper that provided a formal model of the takeover process and renewed interest
in the area was Grossman and Hart (1980). They pointed out that the tender offer
mechanism involved a free rider problem. If a firm makes a bid for a target in order to
replace its management and run it more efficiently then each of the target’s shareholders
has an incentive to hold out and say no to the bid. The reason is that they will then be
able to benefit from the improvements implemented by the new management. They will
only be willing to tender if the offer price fully reflects the value under the new management. Hence a bidding firm cannot make a profit from tendering for the target. In fact if
there are costs of acquiring information in preparation for the bid or other bidding costs
the firm will make a loss. The free rider problem thus appears to exclude the possibility
of takeovers. Grossman and Hart’s solution to this dilemma was that a firm’s corporate
charter should allow acquirors to obtain benefits unavailable to other shareholders after
the acquisition. They term this process “dilution.”
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Another solution to the free rider problem, pointed out by Shleifer and Vishny
(1986a), is for bidders to be shareholders in the target before making any formal tender
offer. In this way they can benefit from the price appreciation in the “toehold” of shares
they already own even if they pay full price for the remaining shares they need to acquire.
The empirical evidence is not consistent with this argument, however. Bradley, Desai
and Kim (1988) find that the majority of bidders own no shares prior to the tender offer.
A second puzzle that the empirical literature has documented is the fact that bidding
in takeover contests occurs through several large jumps rather than many small ones. For
example, Jennings and Mazzeo (1993) found that the majority of the initial bid premiums
were over 20% of the market value of the target 10 days before the offer. This evidence
conflicts with the standard solution of the English auction model that suggests there
should be many small bid increments. Fishman (1988) argues that the reason for the
large initial premium is to deter potential competitors. In his model, observing a bid
alerts the market to the potential desirability of the target. If the initial bid is low a
second bidder will find it worthwhile to spend the cost to investigate the target. This
second firm may then bid for the target and push out the first bidder or force a higher
price to be paid. By starting with a sufficiently high bid the initial bidder can reduce the
likelihood of this competition.
Much of the theoretical literature has attempted to explain why the defensive measures that many targets adopt may be optimal for their shareholders. Typically the defensive measures are designed to ensure that the bidder that values the company the most
ends up buying it. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986b) develop a model where the
payment of greenmail to a bidder, signals to other interested parties that no “white
knight” is waiting to buy the firm. This puts the firm in play and can lead to a higher
price being paid for it than initially would have been the case.
A survey of the literature on takeovers is contained in Hirshleifer (1995). Since strategic interaction and asymmetric information are the essence of takeover contests game
theory has been central to the literature.
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
In 1963 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission undertook a study of IPOs and
found that the initial short run return on these stocks was significantly positive. Logue
(1973), Ibbotson (1975) and numerous subsequent academic studies have found a similar
result. In a survey of the literature on IPOs, Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) give a figure of
15.3% for the average increase in the stock price during the first day of trading based on
data from 1960–1992. The large short run return on IPOs was for many years one of the
most glaring challenges to market efficiency. The standard symmetric information
models that existed in the 1960s and 1970s were not at all consistent with this observation.
The first paper to provide an appealing explanation of this phenomenon was Rock
(1986). In his model the underpricing occurs because of adverse selection. There are
two groups of buyers for the shares, one is informed about the true value of the stock
10

while the other is uninformed. The informed group will only buy when the offering price
is at or below the true value. This implies that the uninformed will receive a high allocation of overpriced stocks since they will be the only people in the market when the offering price is above the true value. Rock suggested that in order to induce the uninformed
to participate they must be compensated for the overpriced stock they ended up buying.
Underpricing on average is one way of doing this.
Many other theories of underpricing followed. These include underpricing as a signal
(Allen and Faulhaber (1989); Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989)), as a way
of inducing investors to truthfully reveal their valuations (Benveniste and Spindt (1989)),
lawsuit avoidance (Hughes and Thakor (1992)) and price stabilization (Ruud (1993)),
among others.
In addition to the short run underpricing puzzle, there is another anomaly associated
with IPOs. Ritter (1991) documents significant long run underperformance of newly
issued stocks. During the period 1975–1984 he finds a cumulative average underperformance of around 15% from the offer price relative to the matching firm-adjusted return.
Loughran (1993) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) confirmed this long run underperformance in subsequent studies.
The theories that have been put forward to explain long run underperformance are
behavioral. E. Miller (1977) argued that there will be a wide range of opinion concerning
IPOs and the initial price will reflect the most optimistic opinion. As information is
revealed through time, the most optimistic investors will gradually adjust their beliefs and
the price of the stock will fall. Shiller (1990) argues the market for IPOs is subject to an
‘impresario’ effect. Investment banks will try to create the appearance of excess demand
and this will lead to a high price initially but subsequently to underperformance. Finally,
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) suggest that there are swings of investor
sentiment in the IPO market and firms use the “window of
opportunity” created by overpricing to issue equity.
Although IPOs represent a relatively small part of financing activity they have
received a great deal of attention in the academic literature. The reason perhaps is the
extent to which underpricing and overpricing represent a violation of market efficiency.
It is interesting to note that while game theoretic techniques have provided many explanations of underpricing they have not been utilized to explain overpricing. Instead the
explanations presented have relied on eliminating the assumption of rational behavior by
investors.
Intermediation
An area that has been significantly changed by game theoretic models is intermediation. Traditionally, banks and other intermediaries were regarded as ways of reducing
transaction costs (Gurley and Shaw (1960)). Models of banking were not very rich. The
field was dramatically changed by the modeling techniques introduced in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983). The paper considers a simple model where a bank provides insurance to
depositors against liquidity shocks. At the intermediate date customers find out whether
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they require liquidity then or at the final date. There is a cost to liquidating long term
assets at the intermediate date. A deposit contract is used where customers who withdraw first get the promised amount until resources are exhausted after which nothing is
received (i.e., the first come first served constraint). These assumptions result in two
self-fulfilling equilibria. In the good equilibrium everybody believes only those who
have liquidity needs at the intermediate date will withdraw their funds and this outcome
is optimal for both types of depositor. In the bad equilibrium everybody believes everybody else will withdraw. Given the first come first served assumption and that liquidating long term assets is costly, it is optimal for early and late consumers to withdraw and
there is a run on the bank. Diamond and Dybvig argue the bad equilibrium can be eliminated by deposit insurance. In addition to being important as a theory of runs, the paper
was also important in terms of the way in which liquidity needs were introduced and a
similar approach has been adopted in the investigation of many topics.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) together with an earlier paper Bryant (1980) lead to a
large literature on bank runs and panics. For example, Chari and Jagannathan (1988)
consider the role of aggregate risk in causing bank runs. They focus on a signal extraction problem where part of the population observes a signal about the future returns of
bank assets. Others must then try to deduce from observed withdrawals whether an unfavorable signal was received by this group or whether liquidity needs happen to be high.
Chari and Jagannathan are able to show panics occur not only when the economic outlook is poor but also when liquidity needs turn out to be high. Jacklin and Bhattacharya
(1988) compare what happens with bank deposits to what happens when securities are
held directly so runs are not possible. In their model some depositors receive a signal
about the risky investment. They show that either bank deposits or directly held securities can be optimal depending on the characteristics of the risky investment. The comparison of bank-based and stock market-based financial systems has become a widely
considered topic in recent years (see Thakor (1996) and Allen and Gale (1999)).
Other important papers in the banking and intermediation literature that helped transform the area were Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Diamond (1984). Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) developed an adverse selection model where rationing credit is optimal. Diamond
(1984) presented a model of delegated monitoring where banks have an incentive to
monitor borrowers because otherwise they will be unable to pay off depositors. A full
account of the recent literature on banking is contained in Bhattacharya and Thakor
(1993).
3.2 Asset Pricing
Early work incorporating asymmetric information into the asset pricing literature
employed the (non-strategic) concept of rational expectations equilibrium (Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980)). Each market participant is assumed to learn from market prices but still
believe that he does not influence market prices. This literature helped address a number
of novel issues, for example, free riding in the acquisition of information. But a number
of conceptual problems arose in attempting to reconcile asymmetric information with
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competitive analysis, and an explicitly strategic analysis seemed to be called for (Dubey,
Geanakoplos and Shubik (1987)).
This provided one motive for the recent literature on market microstructure. This is
the study of the process and outcomes of exchanging assets under explicit trading rules.
Whereas general equilibrium theory simply assumes an abstract price formation mechanism, the market microstructure literature seeks to explicitly model the process of price
formation, usually in the context of financial markets. The papers that contained the initial important contributions are Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). The
subsequent literature that builds on these two papers is sizable. An excellent account of
this is contained in O’Hara (1995).
Kyle (1985) develops a model with a single risk neutral market maker, a group of
noise traders who buy or sell for exogenous reasons such as liquidity needs and a risk
neutral informed trader. The market maker selects efficient prices and the noise traders
simply submit orders. The informed trader chooses a quantity to maximize his expected
profit. In Glosten and Milgrom (1985) there are also a risk neutral market maker, noise
traders and informed traders. The main difference between this model and that of Kyle is
that the quantities traded are fixed and the focus is on the setting of bid and ask prices
rather than the quantity choice of the informed trader. The market maker sets the bid ask
spread to take into account the possibility that the trader may be informed and have a
better estimate of the true value of the security. As orders are received, the bid and ask
prices change to reflect the possibility that the trader is informed. Also, the model is
competitive in the sense that the market maker is constrained to make zero expected
profits.
A number of other asset-pricing topics in addition to market microstructure have been
influenced by game theory. These include market manipulation models (see Cherian and
Jarrow (1995) for a survey). Also, some financial innovation models use game theoretic
techniques (see Allen and Gale (1994) and Duffie and Rahi (1995)). However, these
areas do not as yet have the visibility of other areas in asset pricing.
Pricing anomalies such as those associated with P/E or P/B ratios that have received
so much attention in recent years are intimately associated with accounting numbers.
Since these numbers are to some extent the outcome of strategic decisions analysis of
these phenomena using game theoretic techniques seems likely to be a fruitful area of
research.

4. Richer Models of Information and Beliefs
Despite the great progress that has been made in finance using game theoretic techniques, many phenomena remain unexplained. One reaction to this has been to move
away from models based on rational behavior and develop behavioral models. We argue
that it is premature to abandon rationality. Recent developments in game theory have
provided powerful new techniques that have the potential to explain many important
financial phenomena. In this section, we review three lines of research and consider their
implications for finance.
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4.1 Higher Order Beliefs
Conventional wisdom in financial markets holds that participants are concerned not
just about fundamentals, but also about what others believe about fundamentals, what
others believe about others’ beliefs, and so on. Remarkably, the mainstream finance literature largely ignores such issues; when such concerns are discussed and modeled, it is
usually in the context of models with irrational actors. Yet the game theory literature
tells us that when there are co-ordination aspects to a strategic situation, such higher
order beliefs are crucially important for fully rational actors.
How do these issues come to be bypassed? We believe that this happens because the
models of asymmetric information that have thus far proved sufficiently tractable to
examine important finance questions are not rich enough to address issues of higher order
beliefs. If it is assumed that players’ types, or signals, are independent, it is (implicitly)
assumed that there is common knowledge of players’ beliefs about other players’ beliefs.
If it is assumed that each signal that a player observes implies a different belief about
fundamentals, it is (implicitly) assumed that a player’s belief about others’ beliefs is
uniquely determined by his belief about fundamentals. Modeling choices made for
“tractability” often have the effect of ruling out an interesting role for higher order
beliefs.
We will discuss in detail one example illustrating how higher order beliefs about fundamentals determine outcomes in a version of Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) model of
intermediation and bank runs. In the environment that we will describe, there is a unique
equilibrium. Thus for each possible “state of the world”, we can determine whether there
is a run, or not. But the “state of the world” is not determined only by the “fundamentals,” i.e., the amount of money in the bank. Nor is the state of the world determined by
“sunspots,” i.e., some payoff irrelevant variable that has nothing to do with fundamentals.
Rather, what matters is depositors’ higher order beliefs: what they believe about fundamentals, what they believe others believe, and so on. Our example illustrates why game
theory confirms the common intuition that such higher order beliefs matter and determine
outcomes. After the example, we will review a few attempts to incorporate this type of
argument in models of financial markets.
There are two depositors in a bank. Depositor i’s type is >i; if >i is less than 1, then
depositor i has liquidity needs that require him to withdraw money from the bank; if >i is
more than or equal to 1, he has no liquidity needs and maximizes expected return. If a
depositor withdraws his money from the bank, he obtains a guaranteed payoff of r > 0. If
he leaves his money in, and the other depositor leaves his money in, he gets a payoff of
R, where r < R < 2r. But if he leaves his money in, and the other depositor withdraws, he
gets a payoff of zero.
Notice that there are four states of “fundamentals”: both have liquidity needs,
depositor 1 only has liquidity needs, depositor 2 only has liquidity needs and neither has
liquidity needs. If there was common knowledge of fundamentals, and at least one
depositor had liquidity needs, the unique equilibrium has both depositors withdrawing.
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But if it were common knowledge that neither depositor has liquidity needs, they are
playing a co-ordination game with the following payoffs:

Remain
Withdraw

Remain
R,R
r,0

Withdraw
0,r
r,r

With common knowledge that neither investor has liquidity needs, this game has two
equilibria: both remain and both withdraw. We will be interested in a scenario where
neither depositor has liquidity needs, both know that no one has liquidity needs, both
know that both know this, and so on up to any large number of levels, but nonetheless it
is not common knowledge that no one has liquidity needs. We will show that in this scenario, the unique equilibrium has both depositors withdrawing. Clearly, it is then higher
order beliefs in addition to fundamentals that determine the outcome.
Here is the scenario. The depositors’ types, >1 and >2, are highly correlated; in particular suppose that a random variable T is drawn from a smooth distribution on the nonnegative numbers and each >i is distributed uniformly on the interval [T − ε, T + ε], for
some small ε > 0. Given this probability distribution over types, types differ not only in
fundamentals, but also in beliefs about the other depositor’s fundamentals, and so on. To
see why, recall that a depositor has liquidity needs exactly if >i is less than 1. But when
do both depositors know that both >i are more than or equal to 1? Only if both >i are
more than 1 + 2ε (since each player knows only that the other’s signal is within 2ε of his
own)? When do both depositors know that both know that both >i are more than 1? Only
if both >i are more than 1 + 4ε. To see this suppose ε = 0.1 and depositor 1 receives the
signal >1 = 1.3. She can deduce that T is within the range 1.2−1.4 and hence that
depositor 2’s signal is within the range 1.1−1.5. However, if depositor 2 received the
signal >2 = 1.1 then he attaches a positive probability to depositor 1 having >1 < 1. Only
if depositor 1’s signal was 1 + 4ε = 1.4 or above would this possibility be avoided. This
argument iterates to ensure that there is never common knowledge that payoffs are given
by the above matrix.
What do these higher order beliefs imply? In fact, for small enough ε, the unique
equilibrium of this game has both depositors always withdrawing, whatever signals they
observe. Observe first that by assumption each depositor must withdraw if >i < 1, i.e., if
she or he has liquidity needs. But suppose depositor 1’s strategy was to remain only if >i
was more than k, for some 1 < k; and suppose depositor 2 observed signal k. For small ε,
he would attach probability about ½ to depositor 1 observing a lower signal, and therefore withdrawing. Therefore depositor 2 would have an expected payoff of about ½R to
remaining and r to withdrawing. Since r > ½R by assumption, he would have a strict best
response to withdraw if he observed k. In fact, his unique best response is to withdraw if
his signal is less than some cut-off point strictly larger than k. But this implies that each
depositor must have a higher cutoff for remaining than the other. This is a contradiction.
So the unique equilibrium has both depositors always withdrawing.
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This argument may sound paradoxical. After all, we know that if there was common
knowledge that payoffs were given by the above matrix (i.e., both >i were above 1), then
there would be an equilibrium where both depositors remained. The key feature of the
incomplete information environment is that while there are only four states of fundamentals, there is a continuum of states corresponding to different higher order beliefs. In
all of them, there is a lack of common knowledge that both depositors do not have
liquidity needs. Given our particular assumptions on payoffs, this is enough to guarantee
withdrawal.
We do not intend to imply by the above argument that depositors are able to reason to
very high levels about the beliefs and knowledge of other depositors. The point is simply
that some information structures fail to generate sufficient common knowledge to support
co-ordination on risky outcomes. How much common knowledge is “sufficient” is
documented in the game theory literature: what is required is the existence of “almost
public” events, i.e., events that everyone believes very likely whenever they are true (see
Monderer and Samet (1989) and Morris, Rob and Shin (1995)). While participants in
financial markets may be unable to reason to very high levels of beliefs and knowledge,
they should be able to recognize the existence or non-existence of almost public events.
The above example is a version of one introduced by Carlsson and van Damme
(1993). Earlier work by Halpern (1986) and Rubinstein (1989) developed the link
between co-ordination and common knowledge (see Morris and Shin (1997) for a survey
of these developments). Morris and Shin (1998) generalize the logic of the above example to a model with a continuum of investors deciding whether or not to attack a currency
with a fixed peg. Higher order beliefs are a key determinant of investors’ ability to coordinate their behavior, and thus a key factor in determining when currency attacks occur.
A number of other models have explored the role of higher order beliefs in finance.
In Abel and Mailath (1994), risk neutral investors subscribe to securities paid from a new
project’s revenues. They note that it is possible that all investors subscribe to the new
securities even though all investors’ expected return is negative. This could not happen if
it was common knowledge that all investors’ expected return was negative.
Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993) consider a rational expectations equilibrium of a
dynamic asset trading economy with a finite horizon, asymmetric information and short
sales constraints. They note that an asset may trade at a positive price, even though every
trader knows that the asset is worthless. Even though each trader knows that the asset is
worthless, he attaches positive probability to some other trader assigning positive expected value to the asset in some future contingency. It is worth holding the asset for that
reason. Again, this could not occur if it were common knowledge that the asset was
worthless.
Kraus and Smith (1989) describe a model where the arrival of information about
others’ information (not new information about fundamentals) drives the market. Kraus
and Smith (1998) consider a model where multiple self-fulfilling equilibria arise because
of uncertainty about other investors’ beliefs. They term this “endogenous sunspots.” It is
shown that such sunspots can produce “pseudo-bubbles” where asset prices are higher
than in the equilibrium with common knowledge.
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Shin (1996) compares the performance of decentralized markets with dealership markets. While both perform the same in a complete information environment, he notes that
the decentralized market performs worse in the presence of higher order uncertainty
about endowments. The intuition is that a decentralized market requires co-ordination
that is sensitive to a lack of common knowledge, whereas the dealership requires less coordination.
4.2 Informational Cascades
A more developed literature has been concerned with informational cascades. An
early example was Welch (1992). A group of potential investors must decide whether to
invest in an initial public offering (IPO) sequentially. Each investor has some private
information about the IPO. Suppose that the first few investors happen to observe bad
signals and choose not to invest. Later investors, even if they observed good signals,
would ignore their own private information and not invest on the basis of the (public)
information implicit in others’ decisions not to invest. But now even if the majority of
late moving investors has good information, their good information is never revealed to
the market. Thus inefficiencies arise in the aggregation of private information because
the investors’ actions provide only a coarse signal of their private information. This type
of phenomenon has been analyzed more generally by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992). Finance applications are surveyed in Devenow and Welch
(1996).
It is important to note that informational cascades occur even in the absence of any
payoff interaction between decision makers. In the Welch (1992) account of initial public offerings, investors do not care whether others invest or not; they merely care about
the information implicit in others’ decisions whether to invest. But the argument does
rely on decisions being made sequentially and publicly. Thus an informational cascades
account of bank runs would go as follows. Either the bank is going to collapse or it will
not, independent of the actions of depositors. Depositors decide whether to withdraw
sequentially. If the first few investors happened to have good news, the bank would survive; if they happened to have bad news, the bank would not survive. By contrast, in the
previous section, we described a scenario where despite the fact that all investors knew
for sure that there was no need for the bank to collapse, it had to collapse because of a
lack of common knowledge that the bank was viable. That scenario arose only because
of payoff interaction (each depositor’s payoff depends on other depositors’ actions,
because they influence the probability of collapse); but it occurred even when all decisions were made simultaneously.
One major weakness of the informational cascade argument is that it relies on action
sets being too coarse to reveal private information (see Lee (1993)). There are some
contexts where this assumption is natural: for example, investors’ decisions whether to
subscribe to initial public offerings at a fixed offer price (although even then the volume
demanded might reveal information continuously). But once prices are endogenized, the
(continuum) set of possible prices will tend to reveal prices. Two natural reasons why
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informational cascades might nonetheless occur in markets with endogenous price formation have been introduced in the literature. If investors face transaction costs, they
may tend not to trade on the basis of small pieces of information (Lee (1997)). In this
case, market crashes might occur when a large number of investors, who have observed
bad news but not acted on it, observe a (small) public signal that pushes them into trading
despite transaction costs. Avery and Zemsky (1996) exploit the fact that although prices
may provide rich signals about private information, if private information is rich enough
(and, in particular, multi-dimensional), the market will not be able to infer private information from prices.
4.3 Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs
Each of the two previous literatures we reviewed concerned richer models of asymmetric information. We conclude by discussing the more basic question of how differences in beliefs are modeled. A conventional modeling assumption in economics and
finance is the common prior assumption: rational agents may observe different signals
(i.e., there may be asymmetric information) but it is assumed that their posterior beliefs
could have been derived by updating a common prior belief on some state space. Put differently, it is assumed that all differences in beliefs are the result of differences in
information, not differences in prior beliefs.
For some purposes, it does not matter if differences in beliefs are explained by different information or differences in priors. For example, Lintner (1969) derived a CAPM
with heterogeneous beliefs and – assuming, as he did, that investors do not learn from
prices – the origin of their differences in beliefs did not matter. It is only once it is
assumed that individuals learn from others’ actions (or prices that depend on others’
actions) that the distinction becomes important. Thus the distinction began to be emphasized in finance exactly when game theoretic and information theoretic issues were introduced. Most importantly, “no trade” theorems, such as that of Milgrom and Stokey
(1982), established that differences in beliefs based on differences in information alone
could not lead to trade.
But while the distinction is undoubtedly crucial, this does not justify a claim that heterogeneous prior beliefs are inconsistent with rationality (see Morris (1995) for a review
of attempts to justify this claim; see also Gul (1998) and Aumann (1998)). In any case,
there is undoubtedly a significant middle ground between the extreme assumptions that
(1) participants in financial markets are irrational; and (2) all differences in beliefs are
explained by differences in information. We will briefly review some work in finance
within this middle ground.
Harrison and Kreps (1978) considered a dynamic model where traders were risk
neutral, had heterogeneous prior beliefs (not explained by differences in information)
about the dividend process of a risky asset, and were short sales constrained in that asset.
They observed that the price of an asset would typically be more than any trader’s fundamental value of the asset (the discounted expected dividend) because of the option
value of being able to sell the asset to some other trader with a higher valuation in the
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future. Morris (1996) examined a version of the Harrison and Kreps model where
although traders start out with heterogeneous prior beliefs, they are able to learn the true
dividend process through time; a re-sale premium nonetheless arises from reflecting the
divergence of opinion before learning has occurred. Thus this model provides a formalization of E. Miller’s (1977) explanation of the opening market overvaluation of initial
public offerings: lack of learning opportunities implies greater heterogeneity of beliefs
implies higher prices.
The above results concerned competitive models, and were thus non-strategic. But
heterogeneous prior beliefs play a similar role in strategic models of trading volume.
Trading volume has remained a basic puzzle in the finance literature. It is hard to justify
the absolute volume of trade using standard models where trade is generated by optimal
diversification with common prior beliefs. Empirically relevant models thus resort to
modeling shortcuts, such as the existence of noise traders. But ultimately the sources of
speculative trades must be modeled and differences of opinion (heterogeneous prior
beliefs) are surely an important source of trade.
In Harris and Raviv (1993), traders disagree about the likelihood of alternative public
signals conditional on payoff relevant events. They present a simple model incorporating
this feature that naturally explains the positive autocorrelation of trading volume and the
correlation between absolute price changes and volume as well a number of other features of financial market data. A number of other authors have derived similar results
(see, e.g., Varian (1989) and Biais and Bossaerts (1998)). The intuition for such results is
similar to that of noise trader models. But we believe that explicitly modeling the
rational differences in beliefs that lead to trade will ultimately lead to better understanding.
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